Background: Each year, the Canadian government assigns inspectors to visit firms and ensure compliance to the
Introduction
E ach year, the Labour Program of the Canadian government sends inspectors to fi rms in the federal jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the Canada Labour Code (Labour Code). Some of these inspections relate to Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) provisions, which aim to guarantee safe working conditions in workplaces. Those inspections include proactive inspections, namely, inspections that are the initiative of the department. The targeting rule employed to choose inspected fi rms is a policy set by the Labour Program of Employment and Social Development in Canada.
In part, the current targeting rule assigns inspections based on previously observed injuries and national and regional priorities in some economic sectors.* Targeting inspections based on past injuries implicitly assumes that the injuries are caused by a lack of compliance with the Labour Code. The logic is that if fi rms have a history of numerous injuries, they are somewhat out of compliance with the Labour Code. Hence, fi rms that have a high rate of injuries are inspected more frequently.
However, some injuries occur on worksites regardless of the compliance of businesses to the Labour Code. For an effi cient use of assignments, the targeting * Worksites under the purview of the Labour Program are grouped into seventeen sectors (or business lines), ranging from the aerial transportation sector to the water transportation sector. SeeAppendix A for a completelist of sectors and regions.
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St-Amant B et al. tool must account for the impact of inspections on reducing injuries. This paper proposes a targeting tool. It presents a new allocation rule based on both a combined statistical estimation of fi rms' responses to inspections and the eff ectiveness of the department in reducing injuries. Based on Canadian data from businesses under federal jurisdiction, the estimation of this new allocation rule suggests an 18% improvement in terms of reduced injuries, while the same average number of inspections is still performed. Based on the average cost of compensation in Canada, this reduction of injuries translates into a savings of 72 million dollars annually. 1 From a statistical perspective, this paper uses an estimation strategy that accounts for the endogeneity of the outcomes induced by the current targeting tool. Since the targeting tool is based on past injuries, a simple estimation of the relationship between current inspections and injuries might refl ect reverse causality. Exogenous shifts in the targeting tool (changes in national and regional priorities) are used as instruments for inspections to circumvent this problem. As the national and regional priorities changed at known dates, they provide a good source of identifi cation. This approach can thus disentangle the impact of the targeting tool from the impact of inspections on injuries. Access to the administrative database and the details of the current targeting technique provide a good basis to estimate the impact of the targeting tool. This instrumental variable technique is implemented in the estimation model reported by Gray and Scholz, which eliminates any potential fi xed eff ects or time eff ects at the site level. [2] [3] [4] [5] A critical review of the literature was published by Tompa, Trevithick and McLeod 6 , but an overview of the papers reporting the impact of inspections on injuries is still useful. Gray and Scholz lay some groundwork by studying the period from 1978-1985 and fi nd that a 10% increase in the number of inspections leads to a 1% decrease in the number of injuries. 2 In a subsequent study performed during the same period, the same authors assessed the possible endogeneity biases arising from the OSHA targeting tool. 5 Using the Chamberlain technique to remove those biases, the authors fi nd that a 10% increase in the number of inspections leads to a cumulative 2.2% decrease in the number of injuries. He did not observe an eff ect of inspections whatsoever and concluded that penalties imposed by OSHA are too low. Barteland and Thomas provided evidence that inspections (combined with a fi ning system) decrease the number of injuries. 9 Their identifi cation strategy relies on structural equations identifying the "supply and demand" for injuries. The small impact of inspections on injuries raises questions about the very existence of OSHA.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as described below. Section two presents the datasets used and the methodology. Section three focuses on the results and presents the new targeting tool and its assessed impact. A brief description of the conclusions follows in section four. The objective of this study is to provide an estimate of the impact of inspections on reducing injury.
Methodology
The statistical analysis was performed on a dataset generated by matching two administrative databases, namely the Federal Jurisdiction Injury Database (FJID) and the Labour Application 2000 Administrative Database (LA2000).
FJID has recorded all information contained in the Employer's Annual Hazardous Occurrence Report (EAHO report, since 1982. 10 These reports contain information on the number of fatal injuries, minor injuries and (nonfatal) disabling injuries at worksites under federal jurisdiction. They also contain information about the number of hours worked, full-time equivalent employees (FTEs), front-line employees, and deskassigned employees. Information about each worksite, such as its address and its economic sector (Table A2) , is also maintained in the records. I use the following two defi nitions throughout this paper:
1. A "disabling injury" is "any employment injury or an occupational disease that results in either time loss, or modifi ed duties". 10 It encompasses both fatalities and nonfatal disabling injuries. Unless mentioned otherwise in the text, disabling injuries and injuries are used interchangeably.
2. The "disabling injury incidence rate" (DIIR) is the ratio of the disabling injuries divided by the number of FTE multiplied by 100. 
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Estimation Technique
The responses of fi rms to proactive inspections are modeled using the established framework developed by Gray and Scholz. 2,4,5 ǂ This framework estimates the change in the number of disabling injuries based on the number of inspections one year earlier and a set of controls; see equation (1) . The dependent variable is modeled as the change in the number of disabling injuries from one year to another. The fi rst explanatory variable is a constant. Because the equation measures diff erences, it is expected to be zero. The coeffi cient measures the impact of inspections (insp it ) on the change in the number of disabling injuries (∆disab it ), which is expected to be negative.
∆disab it =β 0 +β 1 insp it +β 2 hours it +β 3 ∆vio it +β 5 react it +ε it ∀it (1)
The controls that are included account for other possible factors that may infl uence disabling injuries. First, the change in the size of the fi rm, which is measured in total number of hours (hours it ), is assumed to have a level eff ect on injuries. The two remaining variables are proxies for the "safety culture" within fi rms. The variable ∆vio it is a measure of the change in the number of citations at the worksite. The last variable (react it ) is a measure of the change in the number of reactive inspections, namely, inspections initiated by complaints from workers (or, to a lesser extent, from employees). These coeffi cients are expected to be positive, as delays and reactive complaints are indications of indiff erence towards safety. Finally, the last term (ε it ) accounts for the unexplained factors that a linear model is unable to capture.
Th e Current Targeting Tool
In addition to developing Canadian estimates, this paper diff ers from previous published studies by instrumenting inspections through exogenous changes in the targeting tool. Since the targeting tool assigns inspections based in part on past injuries, a simple regression analysis of the eff ect of inspections on injuries would bias estimates downwards or even reverse the sign of the estimate. Using proper instruments, the reversed causation is removed and the impact of inspections is able to be properly identifi ed.
The current targeting tool assigns inspections according to fi ve dimensions. 12 These dimensions are national priorities, regional priorities, the sector average DIIR and the raw number of disabling injuries per site. As explained in the introduction, national and regional priorities are established by the department as sectors that should be inspected more frequently, and the only diff erence between these priorities is whether they are applied to a region or the whole country. The last three dimensions are used together as a composite priority index: the fi ve-year average number of disabling injuries is multiplied by a worksite's DIIR and divided by the DIIR average of the sector over the past fi ve years. This index provides an estimate of the importance of the number of injuries occurring at a worksite compared to the sector average. The sector average DIIR is also used to account for the relative diff erences in the number of injuries persect or, while the deviations from the mean are used to position a specifi c fi rm in terms of severity with respect to the sector.
From a statistical standpoint, these indicators suggest a simple estimation strategy to model the number of inspections at a particular worksite during a specifi c year. The following reduced form is the model employed to refl ect the government's targeting tool:
Where, s is an index covering economic sectors. Equation (2) states that the number of inspections at site i at year t is a function of a regional constant, the number of disabling injuries at that worksite in the last fi ve years, the site DIIR in the last year, the last fi veyear DIIR of the sector, and a set of dummy variables that indicate whether a particular sector is either a national priority (nat siT ) or a regional priority (reg siT ).
The sign of the site DIIR coeffi cient is expected to be positive, refl ecting the current allocation rule: fi rms at which more injuries occurred in the past should be inspected more frequently. The signs of the sector DIIRs are expected to be negative because they are part of the denominator in the priority index. The
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tiering coeffi cients should also be positive, and they should increase with the tiering category. Likewise, if a sector is a regional or a national priority, the number of inspections should increase.
For instrumentation, a functional form that includes only the variables that are not related to the number of injuries on the site is used. Thus, the following equation is used to defi ne the instrumental variable:
Equations Estimated and the Proposed Policy Reform Mathematically, the solution to the following program is sought:
where, disab s is the number of injuries in a particular sector, w s is the number of sites in sector s, is the sector-relevant estimated coeffi cients from equation (4) c s and is a constant that is not infl uenced by the choice of inspections, the remainder of equation (4) Equation (6) is interpreted as follows: the number of inspections in sector s is proportional to the fraction of the relative impact of inspections on injuries in that sector. The ratio measures the effi ciency of inspections in sector s at reducing injuries, which is measured as a percentage. The ratio is a number between zero and one. By multiplying this fraction by m, the total number of inspections, the effi cient allocation of inspections per sector is obtained. Hence, if a sector reduces injuries to a greater extent than another sector after a specifi c number of inspections (if the coeffi cient has a higher magnitude), it should receive a greater number of inspections.
Results and Discussion

Impact of the Current Targeting Tool
As shown in Table 2 , sectors with the highest disabling injury rates were inspected most frequently in 2014. The sole exception to this trend is the Feed, Flour and Seed sector, which has a notable share of inspections but fewer injuries than other sectors (it is set as a national priority by the department).
Although the Public Service sector has a relatively high number of injuries, the yearly number of proactive inspections is somewhat lower than in other sectors with high injury rates, as shown in Figure 2 . The number of proactive inspections conducted in that sector is of the same order as in sectors with lower injury levels because the DIIR in the Public Services sector is somewhat smaller than the fi rst three sectors and the Longshoring sector (Figure 3) . Longshoring inspections are set as a regional priority in coastal regions (Atlantic Provinces, Québec and the Northwest Pacifi c region). Table 3 presents the estimates obtained from equations (2) and (3). These estimates are instructive as they capture the current behaviors of operations. The results from these regression analyses can be interpreted as a reduced form of the current rule to assign inspections. The coeffi cients presented are thus viewed as a marginal increase in the number of inspections based on an increase in the variable studied.
The results of the regression analyses shown in Table  3 also illustrate the reverse causality observed after simply attempting to regress injuries on inspections. Because the current targeting tool is based on past injuries, regressing injuries on inspections would show a positive relationship, suggesting (wrongly) that inspections increase injuries.
I fi rst discuss the results presented in the fi rst column, which uses variables related to the site and sector disabling injuries, as well as regional constants. Based on these constants, not all regions of operations are equal in terms of inspections. Atlantic and Québec sites are inspected more frequently on average than their counterparts in other provinces. In Atlantic Provinces, the average number of inspections per site is 0.0556, while the value is seven times smaller in Northwest Pacifi c provinces (and territories). In terms of disabling injuries, the estimates suggest that the cumulative impact, based on the past fi ve years and the variable of the site DIIR, is to increase inspections by 0.013 on average. In other words, an average increase of roughly 75 disabling injuries is required to observe an increase of one inspection (each year) atone specifi c site.
The cumulative eff ect of the sector DIIR has roughly the same impact (0.011) as the site DIIR. Its pattern is interesting and suggests that the department assigns inspections to a sector if a sudden increase in the number of injuries occurs, but the number of inspections decreases afterwards (-0.124 inspections per site in the second year, and additional small corrections afterwards). The increase in the number of sector inspections in the fi fth year suggests a cyclical pattern of fi ve years.
Column two presents the same estimates; in this case, national and regional priorities are added. All disabling injuries and DIIR-related coeffi cients maintained the same magnitude, although some become statistically insignifi cant. As a general rule, if a sector is designed as a national or regional priority, the number of inspections increases in those sectors. For instance, the estimate of the Air Transportation coeffi cient shows an associated increase of 0.246 inspection per site on average. Three notable exceptions are identifi ed,
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St-Amant B et al. The third column presents the impact of national and regional priorities alone, which is the equation used to implement inspections (equation (3)). The coeffi cient associated with the Road Transport sector is 0.0742, as opposed to 0.0576 in the previous estimation. Likewise, worksites in the Rail sector receive an increase of 0.218 inspection on average. Two noticeable exceptions in these coeffi cients are identifi ed: the Broadcasting sector, and the Crown Corporations sector. The negative coeffi cients for these sectors are explained by the small number of sites for these sectors overall. Table 4 presents the estimates obtained from equation (1). The fi rst column presents a naive estimation strategy, which regresses injuries on the number of proactive inspections without any instrumentation. As the column shows, the coeffi cient is not signifi cantly diff erent from zero. This fi nding is caused by two eff ects. As explained in the previous section, current inspections are allocated based on past injuries, and since past injuries are correlated with current injuries, this approach drives a positive correlation between inspections and injuries. The second eff ect, which is the eff ect of interest, is the impact of inspections on reducing injuries. As shown in the fi rst column, when the inspection variable is not instrumented, the estimated coeffi cient is negative, but not statistically diff erent from no eff ect.
Responsiveness of Firms
Column 2 shows the fi ndings obtained when inspections are implemented based on national and regional priorities. Because these variables are not infl uenced by yearly changes in the number of injuries, the positive bias is eliminated. When using instrumental variables, the marginal impact of inspections shifts to a negative value and becomes signifi cantly diff erent from zero. The estimate suggests that an average of 2.6 inspections (1/0.383≈2.6) is required to reduce the number of disabling injuries by one.
The third column adds a set of covariates to the regression equation, namely the change in the size of the worksite measured in the number of hours worked, the change in the number of violations and the change in the number of reactive complaints.
The size of the workforce (measured in hours) has a leveling eff ect, meaning that an increase in the number of worked hours is more likely to increase injuries. The eff ect is quite small, however. An increase of an order of 250,000 hours is required to increase the number of injuries by one, because some small sites have high DIIRs (the Transport sector, for instance), decreasing the average size eff ect. The coeffi cient for violations is positive, suggesting that an increase in the number of violations increases the number of injuries. Thus, a reduction in the number of violations likely reduces the number of injuries. Finally, the number of reactive complaints increases the likelihood of having injuries.
The last two variables combined may represent a good proxy for the extent to which worksites care for safety or regulations. Table 5 presents the values of the estimated coeffi cients from equation (3) for each economic sector. Coeffi cients are estimated and are all negative, suggesting that inspections decrease the number of injuries in each sector. With the exception of the Energy and Mining sector, all coeffi cients are signifi cantly diff erent from zero at least at the 90% level.
A New Alloca on Rule
The reader should notice the important diff erences in the magnitude of the coeffi cients. For instance, the Banking sector has an estimated impact of -14.57, which is approximately twice the magnitude of the second highest coeffi cient in the Postal Contractors sector. The interpretation of each coeffi cient is that an increase in the number of inspections by 1% at a particular site will decrease the number of injuries by an average of 14.57 at a site in that sector. The sector with the smallest responsiveness is the Energy and Mining sector, where a 1% increase in the number of inspections only decreases the number of injuries by 0.25.
The second column shows the inferred effi cientpolicy allocation based on the calculated coeffi cients. The second column measures the percentage of inspections that should be allocated to each sector under an effi cient policy (the solution to equation (6)).
An intuitive approach to understanding the effi cient allocation of resources is to consider the following example. A 1% increase in the number of inspections in the Banking sector amounts to one additional inspection every nine years. This additional inspection can easily be shifted from the Road Transport sector, which undergoes roughly 1,800 inspections annually. The reader should intuitively understand that this displacement of inspections decreases the overall number of injuries: these additional inspections reduce the number of injuries by 15 in the Banking sector, while the diminution of inspections in the Road Transport sector increases injuries by less than .1%. Repeating this displacement of inspections between sectors as often as there is a net gain in injuries will provide the effi cient solution. An effi cient solution is obtained when equation (6) is satisfi ed for all sectors. Sectors marked with an asterisk (*) are constrained.
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Only one exception to this rule is identifi ed: when the marginal decrease in the number of injuries exceeds the actual number of injuries occurring in a sector. In that case, the increase in the number of inspections should decrease the average number of injuries to zero. A good example is the Water Transport sector. An allocation of 2.29% of inspections, as the unconstrained effi cient rule would suggest, would decrease the number of injuries by an average of 3,000 injuries, which is clearly excessive because only an average of 176.6 injuries have been recorded in the past fi ve years. Doubling inspections (precisely, a 102.9% increase) is suffi cient to decrease the average number of injuries to zero. When this situation occurs, these sectors are said to be constrained. When a suffi cient number of injuries are recorded in the sector, the allocation should then follow the effi cient allocation rule provided by equation (6) .
The proposed policy is described in detail in Table 6 . Sectors marked with an asterisk are constrained. The fi rst panel (6a) describes three counterfactual policies in terms of injuries (results), while the second panel describes the same policies in terms of inspections (means). The fi rst column presents the current average number of injuries in each sector over the last fi ve years. It describes the state of injuries within fi rms based on the current targeting tool. The next column presents the number of injuries that would occur if no inspections were performed. Because inspections reduce the number of disabling injuries, this counterfactual condition represents an overall increase in injuries.
The third and fourth columns present the impact of the effi cient allocation in terms of both injuries and percentages. The "takeaway" is that the new effi cient allocation approach reduces injuries by 18.17% on average. The last two columns also show an effi cient allocation of resources, with a 10% increase in the number of proactive inspections. This increase in the number of inspections would translate to a 23.33% reduction in the number of injuries compared to the current allocation.
The columns of the second panel (6b, below) refer to the same counterfactual policies as the fi rst panel, but now focus on inspections rather than injuries. The third and fourth columns show a signifi cant departure from the current allocation of inspections. For instance, 59% and 18% decreases in the numbers of inspections are observed in the Air and Road Transport sectors, respectively. Freeing inspections from these sectors provides resources that can be redistributed to sectors where inspections have a greater impact. In particular, inspections in the Postal Contractor, Crown Corporations and Banking sectors increase by 362%, 180% and 77%, respectively. To a lesser extent, an increase is also observed in the Public Service, Grain Elevators and Communications sectors. Longshoring, Rail Transport, and Flour and Seed sectors also achieve a modest increase in the number of inspections. 
Conclusions
This paper provides evidence supporting the hypothesis that organizational health and safety proactive inspections performed at worksites under federal jurisdiction reduce the number of disabling injuries in the workplace. With the allocation rule used by the government as an instrument for inspections, one inspection reduces the number of disabling injuries by 0.33 in the year following the inspection compared to the year of the inspection. In other words, approximately three inspections are required to decrease the number of disabling injuries by one.
When estimates are desegregated by economic sector, a wide range of diff erences in the responsiveness of fi rms to inspections is identifi ed, suggesting that an effi cient allocation of inspections should consider these diff erences. Based on these estimates, an alternative approach to allocating inspections across industries that increases the effi ciency by which inspections reduce injuries is suggested. This approach leads to the displacement of inspections from the Air and Road Transport sectors to other sectors, such as Banking, Postal Contractors and Crown Corporations sectors. The estimates presented in this paper suggest that this reallocation of inspections would reduce the number of disabling injuries by an additional 18%. The new allocation is robust to changes in the estimated coeffi cient.
